{"id":898,"date":"2016-02-28T18:38:43","date_gmt":"2016-02-28T18:38:43","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/polsis.org\/?p=898"},"modified":"2016-02-28T18:38:43","modified_gmt":"2016-02-28T18:38:43","slug":"what-is-going-on-in-ukraine-now","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.bham.ac.uk\/polsis\/2016\/02\/28\/what-is-going-on-in-ukraine-now\/","title":{"rendered":"What Is Going on in Ukraine Now?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Lance Spencer Davies, a Doctoral Researcher in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Birmingham, provides an update on recent developments in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.<\/p>\n

On the face of it, the conflict in Ukraine seems to have stabilised somewhat. Sporadic shelling aside, the last few months of 2015 saw the \u201chot\u201d phase of the conflict in eastern Ukraine wind down to a relative calm.<\/p>\n

Both parties’ forces have been slowly withdrawing in accordance with the latest ceasefire agreement<\/a>, and while there were some isolated clashes<\/a> between the opposing parties over the Christmas period, they haven\u2019t derailed the current plans. Indeed, German Chancellor Angela Merkel<\/a> remains optimsitic about achieving progress in the negotiations.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, Russia\u2019s military attention seems now to be mostly devoted to its military intervention in Syria and the tensions that\u2019s caused with other countries, particularly Turkey<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But it\u2019s easy to forget how serious the situation still is. After all, this conflict has killed more than 9,000 people<\/a> \u2013 and the tension between Ukraine and Russia remains palpable.<\/p>\n

Ukraine has blamed Russia for recent cyber attacks<\/a> against a key Ukrainian power company late last month. This comes amid an ongoing feud between Moscow and Kiev over Ukraine\u2019s outstanding $3 billion Eurobond<\/a>, which it insists cannot be repaid in full.<\/p>\n

Western capitals have continued to place the blame solely on Moscow\u2019s doorstep for destabilising eastern Ukraine in order to alter the landscape of Europe. Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, General Breedlove<\/a>, has called this \u201ca 21st-century offensive employing 21st-century tools for strategic deception and calculated ambiguity to achieve Moscow\u2019s political goals\u201d.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov<\/a>, has declared that \u201cWe do not pursue any evil intentions and we are still open for honest conversation\u201d. In comparison, President Putin<\/a> has been accused of remarking that Russia could take Kiev in two weeks if it wanted to.<\/p>\n

For many observers these contradictions point towards the inherent duplicity in Russia\u2019s behaviour, as it seeks to deliver mixed messages in order to facilitate Moscow\u2019s malevolent aims.<\/p>\n

Yet with Moscow\u2019s support for the opposition forces coinciding with its engagement in the peace effort, has this signalled a complexity underpinning Russia\u2019s behaviour which has not readily been accounted for by Western capitals?<\/p>\n

A paradoxical policy<\/h2>\n

The long-running crisis has fallen into a cycle of escalation and de-escalation, and Moscow\u2019s role in it is as complicated as ever.<\/p>\n

On the one hand, Moscow has provided support to fighters<\/a> in the eastern regions since July 2014, whether they be on the offensive or at the brink of defeat. That decision to support the use of force in violation of Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty is fundamentally politically motivated, and to the extent Russia has acknowledged its role, there has been little pretence otherwise.<\/p>\n

This is a new low even by the standards of Putin\u2019s past behaviour. In the 2008 intervention in South Ossetia, for instance, the Kremlin at least tried to legitimise its policy with reference to international law<\/a>, instead of sticking to brazen denial and obfuscation \u2013 although Putin<\/a> has recently admitted that military specialists have been involved in eastern Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s response has also been linked to its reservations about the spread of instability. While it may be little more than a useful smokescreen<\/a> for Russia\u2019s more obstructionist behaviour, the Kremlin has made at least some effort to help mitigate the humanitarian crisis.<\/p>\n

Russia has continued to participate in the framework of the OSCE\u2019s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM); it\u2019s been a central actor (albeit controversially) in the delivery of humanitarian aid<\/a> in accordance with the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), has accommodated mass refugee flows<\/a>, and has agreed alongside other powers in the settlement process to promote post-conflict reconstruction<\/a> efforts in Ukraine\u2019s eastern regions.<\/p>\n

\n \"\"
\n Ukraine\u2019s Petro Poroshenko remains vigilant.<\/span>
\n Reuters<\/a><\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/p>\n

However, there are limits to this acceptance. Moscow continues to refuse to accept the expansion of the SMM\u2019s capacity of observation along the Russian-Ukrainian border. It also consistently opposes<\/a> the establishment of an international peacekeeping mission, which would inevitably interfere with its military support for the opposition.<\/p>\n

Diplomatic steps<\/h2>\n

Throughout the diplomatic processes in Geneva<\/a> and Minsk<\/a>, Moscow doggedly tried to gain as much leverage as it could for the opposition forces. And despite the West\u2019s worry that the Kremlin may obstruct a new settlement to preserve its influence over the region, this has not ruled out a new negotiated settlement \u2013 but Russia clearly intends to be a central actor in any such agreement.<\/p>\n

Moscow wants a settlement in Ukraine that takes its own interests into consideration. Its preference is evidently for a federation of Ukraine<\/a> via a compromised solution between Kiev and the eastern regions.<\/p>\n

Moscow\u2019s behaviour will always be guided by a complex array of legitimate security interests, guaranteeing involvement in political or security negotiations concerning its immediate regional space. What\u2019s certain is that the Kremlin doesn\u2019t want instability along its border<\/a>, particularly as Ukraine is a potentially huge economic market for Russia (and not least a customer for Gazprom<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Indeed, Russia has remained alert to the consequences of pushing Ukraine into a new spiral of violence<\/a>. But this doesn\u2019t mean that the potential for future conflict has been eradicated \u2013 or that Ukraine is any less wary of Russia\u2019s intentions.<\/p>\n

This article was originally published on 12th January 2016 by The Conversation<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Lance Spencer Davies, a Doctoral Researcher in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Birmingham, provides an update on recent developments in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. On the face of it, the conflict in Ukraine seems to have stabilised somewhat. Sporadic shelling aside, the last few months of 2015 saw … Continue reading “What Is Going on in Ukraine Now?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":144,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,11],"tags":[29,121,128,152],"class_list":["post-898","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-comment-and-analysis","category-uncategorized","tag-conflict","tag-putin","tag-russia","tag-ukraine"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.bham.ac.uk\/polsis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/898","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.bham.ac.uk\/polsis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.bham.ac.uk\/polsis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.bham.ac.uk\/polsis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/144"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.bham.ac.uk\/polsis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=898"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blog.bham.ac.uk\/polsis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/898\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.bham.ac.uk\/polsis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=898"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.bham.ac.uk\/polsis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=898"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.bham.ac.uk\/polsis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=898"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}