The emergence of a new de facto governing authority in Syria under the effective control of Ahmed al-Sharaa has been accompanied by reports of successive violence directed against distinct ethno-religious communities, including Druze, Alawite, and most recently Kurdish and Yezidi (Ezidi) populations in and around Aleppo (Halab). While international law demands restraint before applying the legal label of genocide, it equally requires vigilance where patterns of conduct reflect recognised pathways through which genocide and ethnic cleansing historically unfold.
Al-Sharaa has been widely reported as having prior associations with radical Islamist armed groups. From an international law perspective, the issue is not one of political legitimacy but of legal responsibility; effective control over territory and population engages binding obligations under international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and the Genocide Convention.[1] Against this backdrop, the reported persecution of Druze, Alawite, and Kurdish communities under his authority calls into question compliance with binding obligations to protect minority populations.[2]
Since the transitional presidency began in January 2025, credible reporting has documented serious abuses affecting Alawite and Druze communities, continued severe vulnerability for Christians, including a mass-casualty church attack, and large-scale civilian displacement and harm in renewed fighting affecting Kurdish and Yezidi neighbourhoods in Aleppo.
Genocide in International Law: Thresholds and Inference
Genocide is defined in Article II of the Genocide Convention and Article 6 of the Rome Statute as the commission of certain prohibited acts with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such. The requirement of specific intent (dolus specialis) sets genocide apart from other international crimes.
However, international jurisprudence has consistently affirmed that genocidal intent is rarely explicit. In cases such as Akayesu, Krstić, and Popović, international tribunals recognised that intent may be inferred from the pattern, scale, and systematic nature of conduct, including selective targeting of protected groups, repetition of violence, destruction of leadership, and the creation of conditions incompatible with group survival.
Importantly, genocide is not confined to mass killing. Article II(c) explicitly includes “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” Forced displacement, exclusion from territory, and prevention of return may fall within this provision when accompanied by the requisite intent.
Ethnic Cleansing as a Legal Indicator
Although ethnic cleansing is not an autonomous crime, it is a concept firmly recognised in international jurisprudence as a form of genocide. The ICTY repeatedly treated ethnic cleansing as powerful circumstantial evidence of genocidal intent, particularly where displacement was permanent, violent, and group-directed. A particularly troubling feature of the Syrian situation is the sequential targeting of different protected groups under the authority of the same de facto power structure. In Krstić, the ICTY emphasised that genocidal intent may be inferred from campaigns designed to reshape territory by removing unwanted groups.
The recent attacks on Kurdish-majority districts in Halab (Aleppo) by forces aligned with the de facto authority of Ahmed al-Sharaa must be analysed through the legal frameworks of ethnic cleansing and genocide, particularly given the Kurds’ status as a protected ethnic group. Kurdish communities have previously been subjected to acts recognised as genocide, most notably during the Anfal campaign, placing them among populations at heightened risk of atrocity recurrence and therefore entitled to protection rather than renewed marginalisation.
The reported shelling, destruction of infrastructure, civilian harm, and large-scale displacement of Kurdish residents from Halab correspond with this definition, where carried out because of ethnic identity, and may amount to forcible transfer. From the perspective of genocide law, Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention encompasses conduct that deliberately inflicts conditions of life calculated to bring about a group’s destruction in part. International jurisprudence confirms that targeting a substantial part of a protected group within a specific territory may satisfy this threshold.
The Genocide Convention imposes obligations erga omnes, and the Rome Statute contemplates responsibility through command responsibility, aiding and abetting, and omission.
Prevention Is Not Optional: The Legal Duty to Act
Crucially, international law does not require genocide to be completed before obligations arise. International law imposes a clear duty to prevent genocide, expressly codified in Article I of the Genocide Convention. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has confirmed that this obligation arises once a serious risk of genocide becomes apparent, not only after genocide has been conclusively established. In Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro, the Court held that prevention is an obligation of conduct, proportionate to an actor’s capacity to influence events. This approach was reaffirmed more recently in The Gambia v Myanmar, where the ICJ ordered Myanmar to take all measures within its power to prevent genocidal aggression against the Rohingya.
Further, these obligations are reinforced by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005, which affirms that states bear the primary responsibility to protect populations from genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing, and that the international community must act where a state fails to do so. R2P does not create new law, but operationalises existing duties under the Genocide Convention by emphasising early warning, prevention, and collective response.
Where such indicators are present, inaction itself may constitute a breach of international obligations. Prevention, therefore, requires timely diplomatic engagement, protection of civilians, support for accountability mechanisms, and refusal to legitimise de facto authorities that consolidate power through group-based violence.
Why This Matters for International Law
This blogpost has argued that developments in contemporary Syria cannot be reduced to isolated security incidents or transitional instability. Viewed through the lens of international law, the reported pattern of violence against Druze, Alawite, Christian, and Kurdish communities under a single de facto authority raises serious concerns engaging the doctrines of ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and, at their most grave, genocide. International jurisprudence confirms that genocidal intent need not be explicit and may be inferred from patterns of conduct, including sequential targeting of protected groups, forced displacement, destruction of civilian infrastructure, and the creation of conditions incompatible with group survival.
International law does not permit neutrality in the face of such warning signs. The Genocide Convention, as authoritatively interpreted by the ICJ, imposes a binding duty to prevent genocide once a serious risk becomes apparent, a duty reinforced and operationalised by the Responsibility to Protect. Where de facto authorities exercise effective control, they incur legal obligations; where states and the international community have the capacity to influence events, inaction itself may amount to a breach of international responsibility.
History shows that genocide is often recognised only after irreversible harm has occurred. The legal frameworks examined here exist precisely to prevent that outcome. In Syria, the convergence of early-warning indicators demands timely preventive action, protection of vulnerable populations, and accountability-oriented engagement consistent with international law, rather than political normalisation or strategic silence.
[1] See ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion); Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (2007); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), [1986] ICJ Rep 14, paras 115–116
[2] See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts 6–7; Genocide Convention, arts I–II; ICTY jurisprudence.