It is easy to make a practical case for protecting a working donkey for a family in a Maasai community in Kenya. An animal that is healthy and well cared for can help a household earn a living and maybe perform certain functions like transportation of water and firewood. But what happens when the donkey grows old, is injured, or can no longer work? Its need for care may increase just as its economic value falls. This question interests me in my doctoral research on the history, text and implementation of the Animal Welfare Strategy for Africa (AWSA). I argue that animals should receive legal protection even when caring for them brings no financial return. This process of giving their interests weight requires serious attention to the circumstances of people who depend on them.
The case for linking welfare and development
The AWSA was developed under the leadership of the African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR) and it places animal welfare within a wider development agenda. Its vision recognises animals as sentient beings and its goal connects better welfare with improved human well-being, more secure livelihoods, and economic growth. There are good reasons for making those connections. Where families depend on animals for transport or farming, illness and injury can affect household income. Support for animal welfare can be easier to obtain when public authorities see its value for people. A government facing competing demands on its budget may be persuaded by a policy that can improve both.
I take those benefits seriously. People who rely on animals need workable ways to meet welfare standards. Connecting animal welfare with development also creates opportunities to bring it into agricultural policy and public spending, where decisions affecting animals are routinely made within many countries. The difficulty arises when the economic case becomes the sole test of whether protection is worthwhile. An animal may need treatment that costs more than any future earnings. Giving animals enough space to move or allowing a working animal to rest can also carry costs.
The AWSA actually acknowledges this problem. Its executive summary explains that some welfare improvements can increase productivity, while others, including providing more space or reducing pain, can raise production costs. The possibility that welfare and economic advantage will diverge is present in the strategy itself. This is what then makes its recognition of sentience significant. If animals’ capacity to suffer gives us a reason to protect them, that reason must remain relevant even when protection is expensive. Otherwise, the promise depends on a business calculation the animal cannot influence.
Protecting animals when welfare costs more
Animal welfare legislation already shows how difficult these choices can be. In England and Wales, section 9 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 requires people responsible for animals to take reasonable steps to meet their welfare needs to the extent required by good practice. Section 4, addressing unnecessary suffering, includes the purpose of the conduct and proportionality among the relevant considerations. These provisions give animals protection while leaving room for human use. They also leave legal questions about which purposes justify suffering and what counts as reasonable care. Similar questions arise when a regional strategy like the AWSA is translated into national law. The AWSA calls for welfare to be incorporated into legislation. As a continental policy strategy, it guides reform. Enforceable duties are highly dependent on domestic law and domestic welfare duties ideally, should continue to protect animals when the economic incentive to care for them is weak.
This should include a basic level of care that continues when an animal is no longer productive, with clear responsibilities for meeting it. It should also include enforceable limits on harmful practices, even where those practices are profitable. Precisely what those duties require will depend on the activity and the animal concerned, but profitability alone should be insufficient to settle the matter.
There is also the question of who pays. Requiring a poor owner to obtain veterinary treatment achieves little if treatment is unavailable or unaffordable. Governments need to consider what services and support make compliance possible and reasonably achievable. Larger businesses should bear the costs of meeting welfare standards within their operations. A good initiative will be that the burden should reflect who benefits from animal use and who has the capacity to improve conditions.
My research approaches these issues (among many others) through Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), which examines international law’s relationship with colonial histories and unequal power. This encourages scrutiny of who defines welfare standards and who carries the cost of complying with them. African communities should have a meaningful role in deciding how protection is put into practice. Respect for local circumstances should lead to practical support for meeting welfare duties. It should also allow people who work with animals to shape the measures they are expected to follow. A policy that demands costly changes without providing workable means of making them can fail both animals and the people who care for them, which I think is dangerous.
The AWSA’s recognition of sentience gives us a basis for asking whether welfare duties give sufficient weight to animals’ own interests. One test is the protection available when an animal needs care and providing it brings no financial advantage. A donkey that can no longer carry a load still needs food and care. Its claim to legal protection should survive the end of its working life. Putting that principle into practice will require attention to local attitudes towards animals, the pressures facing households that depend on their labour, and practical support to make continued care possible.